Social inequality and immigration in Europe: A preliminary approach of the Greek Case


Samy Alexandridis

Abstract
This article’s intent is to explore social inequality in Greece, related to the criminalization of irregular migration during the European political project processes. Furthermore, it will reflect on the ways in which the social movement sector can affect social change. In Greece, the illegalization of the “other” or the “different” has been reproducing empathy, as well as class, gender and race inequalities. Temporal coalitions and networks for social justice are born within a number of different immigrant communities, collectives, political groups and organizations, which overcome national and cultural differences - thus creating socio-cultural and political spaces that are independent of, or competitive with, the political institutions and the dominant socio-cultural identities.Using tools from Sociology of Social Movements and its methodological workshop, we will raise primal questions and hypotheses about the ways in which networks of the antiracist movement in Greece and their organizational processes maintain a high level of solidarity among citizens and “non-citizens”, producing feelings of belonging in a political community through successive political struggles, especially in the discursive battlefield of civil society.
The political participation of immigrants in social movements is an informal citizenship and an evolutional process of human rights. Social movements claiming sociopolitical rights for immigrants define citizenship through conflicts against the definition of European citizenship as a protected set of privileges and cultural superiority.
  

Introduction
Greece is considered a gate, a transit to, a south east ‘border’ to Europe for immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The south-east entrance to Europe, according to the Human Rights Watch Report[1], is a “stuck in a revolving door”, as the EU asylum law, via Dublin II regulation[2], requires asylum seekers to lodge their claims for protection in the first European country they set foot. In the southeast entrance of Europe, the Greek police systematically detains arrested immigrants without registering them and secretly expels them to the Turkish side[3]. The two countries often accuse each other for violations of relevant agreements and protocols. Despite the “zero tolerance” policies in the southeast borders, the number of immigrants and refugees is increasing[4]. The asylum denial does not prevent people from entering Europe via Greece; it increases the number of people living in Europe in a marginalized status, without citizenship, civil rights or asylum protection.
Social policies for refugees and immigrants are directly dependent on supranational institutions and financing. Consequently, the priorities of the national states’ policies on migration in the south borders of Europe should be interpreted in their connection to the priorities of the supranational institutions and the European Union. Security policies, new detention camps and technology against the undocumented immigrants’ entrance in the European territory, all reflect the policies of securitization from the Hague Program to the European Pact for Migration. We have to be critical of the argument supporting that the violations of human rights in the southeast entrance to Europe do not reflect the E.U. values and policies, and are only exceptions concerning “bad” states or “bad” governments.
The Human Rights Watch and other organizations like Fortress Europe and Amnesty International report human rights abuse, harassment and detention all across the south borders of Europe. Agreements between Malta, the Italian state and the Libyan State, within the principles of “more oil, less immigrants”[5], reinforce the violation of refugees’ rights in detention camps in Tripoli or Mauritania with the political, financing and military support of the Italian and Spanish States[6]. According to the reports of HRW, UNITED and Amnesty International, allover the south borders of Europe, there are immigrants mistreated in detention and/or forcibly returned to their countries. Apart from the Spanish State, Frontex is also helping the Mauritanian authorities to secure and protect the European borders with new technologies and military equipment[7].
In the name of the European citizens’ security, mobility and citizenship are becoming resources and privileges that reproduce national and class divisions, social discriminations, racism and empathy. The intergovernmental agreements on security and exchanging information policies [through programs, new technologies, networks and institutions] have created a status of general social mistrust, where important information and decisions are partly in control of institutions or actors that are not democratically elected.
The conceptualization of a homogenized European identity responding to the fear of a terrorist attack from the excluded ‘other’, produced resources and a beneficial discursive platform for the nationalistic political powers, parties and movements. The fluid common values of ‘Europeanization’ were established in selective anagoges reproducing fear and empathy. The need for security and protection of the European identity generated a concept of the European citizenship as an imagined area of superiority protected by supranational institutions and reproducing traditional nationalistic practices and values.
When states and supranational institutions fail in social policies, the social movement sector can affect social change.
Immigrant organizations, collectives, immigrant communities, political groups and organizations supporting migration and refugees’ rights in Greece are demanding sociopolitical rights, citizenship and full membership for all immigrants.
Undocumented immigrants’ political participation in movement organizations is an informal citizenship process against their non-citizenship status and against the strategies of the political elites. Immigration is a central political issue in Greece, creating public discourse, demands for social, cultural and institutional change as well as competition in matters of advocacy between social movement organizations, NGOs, political parties and governance institutions. It has also created new social movements, new solidarity networks and new identities.
This article will attempt to discuss the Greek case in a primal level, raising theoretical questions and hypotheses concerning migration, citizenship rights and social inequalities, focusing on politics of conflict. We will approach the concept of a citizenship defined by political struggles, and connected to organizational matters of collective action and social movements.
It is an early approach, aiming to form a basis for a broader empirical research.

1.      Immigration and the European Citizenship
1.1. Securitization from Above
Security and insecurity, especially after the attacks of 9/11, are becoming fundamental values for the introduction of laws and directives. Immigrants without documents are illegal and illegal migration is a threat, an undesired form of human mobility.
According to Kymlicka and Banting “immigration policies reflect a widespread perception of migration as a threat and a burden, which must therefore contained and minimized.”[8] The status of legality or illegality of mobility depends on different states’ policies, laws or in some cases the guard police strategies of entrance denial. Guild, Carrera and Balzacq are pointing out three mechanisms of the transformation of political values in EU, concerning the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: the discursive construction of threats, the development of technological tools as solutions and the tension between intergovernmental and communitarian methods of decision making.[9]
These mechanisms apart from the humanitarian tragedy[10], which they are connected to, reflect a threat for democracy in the European countries. The criminalization of irregular migration is connected to the criminalization of the “other”, the “different”, and the “cultural minorities”. National police and border guards have been given new political and institutional responsibilities in the European democracies. In a way Frontex and the state police, no matter if we are talking about the Spanish, the Greek, the Turkish, The Italian the Mauritanian or the Libyan police have the political authority to decide who is mainstream and secure according to the new constructed European values. Subhabrata Banerjee, in his article about the concept of necrocapitalism as “contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death”[11] writes that “…discourses of ‘civilization’ and ‘development’… created and sustained the binary categories of civilized–barbaric and developed–underdeveloped, where sovereignty always remained on the side of the ‘civilized’ and ‘developed’’[12].
In the discursive frames of governments and main political parties in the European states, the European identity is often defined as a product of dominant universal political values. This definition affects matters of identity and of citizenship rights for immigrants in Europe. Klymlicka and Banting discussing immigration and the welfare state in a global level write that “When immigrants have the right to become permantnent residents they are not allowed to seek any public recognition or accommodation of their distinct identity and culture, they may be expected to hide their ethnicity and assimilate into the mainstream”[13]. In most of the European countries citizenship rights are connected with “tests” where immigrants’ integration is examined through their knowledge of what the committees of a national state consider as the mainstream mixture of a cultural capital that can construct the inherits of  a national and, in the same time, European identity.
According to Schierup, Hansen and Castles the EU policies inspired by the US neoliberalization of economy are characterized by the criminalization of undocumented immigration, the securitization of migration, and the political shift in European asylum policies[14]. Agaben’s concept of the roman homo sacer, as a life that has no value to the society or the gods[15], find a tragic incarnation in the refuges that are imprisoned without a trial in detention camps and in the people that died in the Mediterranean sea or from the mines around the river of Evros - trying to enter the European Union. These lives have been taken “without the charge of homicide”[16].
The concept of Securitization in the European political project, according to the Hague Program, is in contradiction to the meaning of the declaration of the human rights. Freedom and justice are to be regarded only in dependence on the new constructed idea of security[17]. In this argument citizens need for security is more important than human rights. By refusing the asylum statuses and by criminalizing irregular migration the European states did not control or even limit irregular migration. Immigration rates continue growing. The European pact encourages only skilled migration although it admits that migration is also a result of inequalities in global economy[18]. The pact uses the ideological concept of “illegal migration”; this is a discursive construction of immigration as a threat. Immigrants and refugees are considered from the E.U. policies as responsible themselves for their employment and their non citizenship status.
The immigrants are a crucial part of the future working population, not only in Europe but globally[19]. In Europe there are 13.5 million irregular immigrants and about two million refugees and asylum seekers, living in need of social policies. According to the 8th meeting of the ministers of health in the European council in Bratislava, the most serious health problems are concerning the immigrants working in construction, industry and farming.  Their work load increase every year while their salaries are decreasing. A big number of immigrants suffer from chronic neurologic and breath diseases and depression. Health care for immigrants seems more of a privilege than an equal social right[20]. The governments approving policies against immigration are reproducing racism and class inequalities in the three sectors of production.
The intergovernmental agreements on security policies[21] and exchanging information policies through programs, networks, policies and institutions such as Frontex, the Schegen Info – systems, EURODAC, Customs Information System, European Computer System, Eurojust files, the Visa Information System and Treaties like the Prüm Treaty[22] have created a status of general social mistrust where important information and decisions are partly in control of institutions or factors that are nor democratically elected. These structures can be considered as visible sovereign powers, defined as the institutional power to decide the value of a life.

1.2.European citizenship as an imagined, secure and ‘hyper-national’ superiority
In 1996 Balibar was wondering in which ways a European citizenship is possible: “The passport of the European Community citizen tends to function as a guarantee of privileged personal status in the open space which corresponds to the global economy”[23]. It is in this era where an ethnocentric definition of the European identity begins to establish security as a fundamental political value in the European political project. This progress produced discursive resources for the nationalistic political powers in Europe. “Europe of citizens” became an intergovernmental territory of different inclusive and exclusive zones of social and political rights. Immigrant workers and refugees, or “humans as such”, can be excluded from the privileges of the citizenship status as exceptions inside the European states. The immigrants must live by national and international laws, which are not capable to protect their lives. The European citizenship, as a set of sociopolitical rights, is referred to an international territory. It is in the same territory where sociopolitical rights and equal access to the policy institutions and the European political elites’ arenas of decisions are denied to the marginalized social groups.
An important part of the population of the working class in the European states is not institutionally allowed to affect or change the national states’ and the European laws. Two of the main political resources for a “citizen of Europe” are the citizenship status and the right to vote. These resources are to be considered not only as rights or obligations, but also as zones of inclusion and exclusion established by national, racial and class criteria. The “European citizens” are carrying the contradiction of having an identity to be secured and protected in the name of political values and rights that are, in the same time, violated in the same institutional territory where the European identity is constructed, and where it is establishing and secures its citizenship rights.
Refugees are not the only victims of the ideology of security. Securitization was built using ideological resources based on a discursively constructed universality of a homogeneous western civilization and a set of beliefs of fear and threats from different cultures. It seems that privatization of migration[24] is beneficial to the privatization of fear and the militarization of western societies. Fear and empathy are productive political resources for totalitarianism, the same way that solidarity and feelings of commonality are a resource for welfare policies[25].
As the citizenship controls and the police operations are becoming a routine in the centre of the European cities, the military control moves from the border periphery to the “heart” of the cities.  Bulent Diken discussing states of exception and the detention camps for refugees, writes that “…what the post-modern (or‘post-political’) narrations push away is the camp that has become the rule. And just as one cannot narrate modernity without the concentration camp, one cannot tell the story of post-modernity without the camp in the second sense… sovereign power is not only exercised as actuality (in actually delimited spaces) but also as potentiality… by penetrating the whole political/social field, transforming the entire social space into a dislocated biopolitical space” [26]. The legitimization of technological control and panopticon as an assurance of social trust represents a society building established on the biopolitical reproduction of prisons’ structures and total institutions. Tesfahuney and Ek discussing the “long history”[27] of the camp, write that “the privatization and patenting of human, animal, and plant genes and DNA since the late 20th century index the magnitude and depth of the onslaught of the nomos of the camp and its ‘triumphs”.[28]
Citizenship as a theoretical concept is not only a vehicle of a progressive political evolution which leads to human rights. If the imagined political community, where the subject “citizen of Europe” belongs as a member, is the national state and the European Union- then the reality of the refugees camps and the violation of civil, social and human rights are both embedded through laws and formal institutions of governance into the construction of the European citizenship’s collective identity. The institutional legitimating of a collective identity established in exclusions and feelings of racial and ethnic superiority reflects mostly the building of a nation -not a “political community”, a “federation” or a “commonwealth”.
The project of “more Europe” has been a hope for scholars, as it could lead to a human rights-based ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ that could overcome the conflicts and the exclusions that are generated from different national interests[29]. Peo Hansen, discussing a post-national Europe without cosmopolitan guarantees, suggests the term of “hyper –nationalism”[30]. The national political elites of Europe have the flexibility to transfer their political interests in a supranational arena, where important supranational structures function with traditional tools of national sovereignty. Testing the Europanization of asylum policy, which was supposed to deliberate refugees from the discriminations of national states’ sovereignty, through a cosmopolitan effect of the European Union’s involvement, Peo Hansen concludes that “no such progressive dynamic has come to fruition in the land of Europe. Rather, the exact opposite has taken place.”[31]
Although we can’t define a nation of Europeans, a European nationalism exists[32] and affects the statutory and imaginary building of the European citizenship, as well as the citizenship rights in the member states. The enlargement of the European Union baptized the new comers as “new Europeans”, a concept of an imaginary entrance to a protected zone of class privileges and cultural superiority [33].
The nationalistic political groups of the new comers have found political resources in the contradictory policies of the European Union concerning asylum, migration and freedom of movement. The social and economic reconstruction in the New European states increased xenophobia and discrimination[34]. Charles Woolfson discussing labour migration, neo-liberalism and ethno-politics in the new Europe, in his research of the Latvian case, notes the failures of an unviable European citizenship: “The European Union, itself in neo-liberal retreat from a developed social agenda has created the political space for new exclusionary ethno-nationalisms, whatever its ultimate intentions might have been”.[35]
A nationalistic concept of the European identity reproduces nationalistic political values in the member states. The European citizenship as a status of an imagined superiority in the cultural sphere, contributes to the invigoration of national identities which, in a “parallel life”, become embedded in a larger hyper-national or hyper-nationalistic identity. Cosmopolitanism, as well as the European revolutions or the demands of the 70s’ ‘new social movements’ are transformed and assimilated in a simplistic discourse of cultural dominance, capable to establish and silence the social, racial and gender inequalities and discriminations.
The shared values of “Europeaness” are defined more through the “other” or the “different”. The wonder to define the “other” is a beneficial discursive field for the nationalistic political parties and movements.  Questions arise about who is not different or not alien to a fluid, grotesque and undefined mixture of simplistic and selective anagoges and misconceptions of the Hellenic world, the different Christian traditions and religion regimes, the Enlightment, the Renaisance, the women’ social movements, the colonies, the empires, the French Revolution, the nationalistic movements, or whatever someone can imagine as “fountains” for the common values of “Europeaness”. Questions also arise when so many different and contradictory traditions are used and mistreated to legitimate the camps, the technologies of control or the war against terror as securitization of the citizenship rights’ evaluation.

2.      The Greek Case: Social Inequalities, Migration and Social Movements
2.1.Inside the Revolving Door: Sociopolitical Rights of Immigrants in Greece
One million immigrants are living in Greece; almost 10% of the whole population. The percentage of the GDP for social policies is almost 20%. A 14% of it is given for social policies that are concerning the immigrant population in Greece[36]. The immigrant population in Greece is a very important part of the working class.[37]
In 2006, according to the statistics of Greek Social Insurance Foundation the foreign workers are representing the 13.55% of the insured workers, working mainly in low status professions. “Schwarze Arbeit” in Greece is considered to be around 24% of the working population in Greece. Irregular mobility of labor and informal economy does not deal only with the exclusion from social security, but from a set of rights that are denied to regular insured workers as well.
The annual report of the NGO Antigone mentioned more than ten official researches that came to light in 2008 concerning labor and the welfare state in Greece. All of them are proving the positive role of migration in Greek economy and the welfare system[38]. In contrast, immigrants in Greece don’t have full access to sociopolitical rights and social security services, especially those working uninsured. The same research projects are proving that immigrants do not have full medical support, they are discriminated in schools, and they are facing the denial of the state to support them when they apply for civil rights[39]. According to latest researches from social scientists the immigrants are facing more psychological problems than the Greeks[40].
According to Greek State’s recent regulations for migration, only a limited part of civil rights is for sale to the immigrants who can afford it. The so called ‘second generation’ will have a status of a long stay permit, without the status of Greek citizenship only if the following conditions are met: they must at least 18 years old, they must have finished the obligatory first part of the secondary education, and their parents are still living in Greece and owning the number of revenue stamps that allows immigrants to renew their permit to stay. Then, if they know the Greek language and if they have knowledge of the Greek civilization they can buy the long stay permit by paying a fee of 900 Euros[41]. In the first form of the new law there was almost no mention concerning the rights of the second generation, a big demand especially of the immigrant communities and the supporting movements.
If they want to apply for the status of Greek nationality, they have to pay a new fee of 1500 Euros to a committee of the Ministry of Interior. The Committee has no obligation to formulate a justification for its negative or positive decision, and actually only a few teenagers from those who lived their whole life in Greece will get the citizenship rights that are connected with the Greek nationality.
Concerning the Third Country Nationals, the new regulations allow a 10 year permit to stay in Greece instead of the previous permit of undefined duration. The ten year permit does not allow the TCN to go out of the country for a long period.[42] The authorities, through a commission of the Ministry of Interior, can check anytime the person’s character and his cultural integration level[43]. The citizenship in Greece is ethnocentric[44] and reflects aspects of the conservative welfare regime. According to the writings of Esping-Andersen and Schierup, Castles the southern European welfare regimes are “highly influenced by Christian values, which focuses on the conservation of the traditional family and a morally sanctioned social order, and which reproduces a particularistic and hierarchic edifice of citizenship”[45]. An ethnocentric and Christian-centric corporate regime with different hierarchical welfare benefits for different interest groups is by definition a social field of disadvantages and inequalities for immigrants and refugees from Islamic countries that come to Europe from its south borders looking for work or asylum.
The social and political rights of migrant workers in Greece are depended from the number of the revenue stamps that a person collects through his labor activities. In this sense, work is defined more as a duty and an obligation, than a set of rights. Concerning also the fact that informal economy and irregular labor has a high percentage in the sectors of production where the immigrants are employed, it is extremely difficult for migrant workers to collect the beneficial number of the revenue stamps. Work may be a duty, but it’s not a precondition or a vehicle for an individual to become a “full member of a community”. Although they “are doing their duty”, as workers, they can’t always consider themselves as full members or “full” and equal citizens of a political community. The denial of a legal status and the difficulties to get a legal permit are reproduced from Greek state structures which support an economy that its informalization is a project from “above”, as strategies for more benefits, and from “below”, as strategies for survival[46].
Schierup and Castles call the differentiation of populations on the basis of ethnicity, origins and legal status by the term of “racialised ethnicity”. New hierarchies, based on gender, class and location in the neo-liberalisation of European societies produced new forms of social exclusion and grievances that generated uprisings in Europe during the last decade[47].The Greek constitution’s establishment of citizenship and sociopolitical rights refers to citizens mostly as Greeks.  Still, its paragraphs have been interpreted in a way that all the documented immigrants are also citizens, and that everyone who stays in the Greek territory has a minimum of social and political rights, as a member of a community and as a person[48]. But state’s policies in Greece created a regime that denies direct access to social services for those who work or stay in Greece and do not have the status of Greek ethnicity or European citizenship.

2.2 Gender Inequalities and Migration in Greece
The reproduction of traditional Christian and family values, through a conservative welfare regime, reflects gender inequalities in social roles and the division of labour.  The gender of unemployment in Greece is female and the age of unemployment is between 19 to 30 years old[49]. The formal political participation for women in Greece is low, especially in the Greek parliament.  Concerning the immigrant women, half of the immigrant population in Greece is women, almost 450.000 (49%). 14.000 immigrant women are regular workers producing house services, as well as health and social care services for members of the Greek families. 2.000 are from Albania and 12.000 from Eastern European countries or from Asian countries[50]. There is a big number of irregular female workers in this sector working uninsured, and for whom there are no specific data. Different estimates raise the number of female immigrants in domestic work to 80.000[51]. The fact that most of the female domestic workers are working uninsured[52] affects their political and social rights. The legal permit to stay and to work in Greece, according to the Greek Law, depends on the social security revenue stamps, which a person collects through insured employment. The uninsured work is keeping immigrant women in a marginalized status, concerning their political and social rights.
It is interesting to note that educated women from ex socialist countries are becoming workers in the households of advanced economies. These women are actually producing welfare services in privatized fields, which the welfare state has abandoned. According to Helma Lutz’s research on domestic work in Germany, domestic services are not only physically but also emotionally demanding[53]. The “necessary social and emotional skills” for a “successfully performing domestic work”[54] created a newly oriented household profession, more advanced than the state’s care services. Still, domestic work resists professionalization[55] and is established on a mix of formal and, mostly, informal regulations and informal strategies between employees and employers.[56]
According to researchers like Brigitte Anderson the racialisation of domestic labour poses to feminism and to political theory questions about racial and gender division and reproduction of dominated social roles for women[57]. Domestic work in private European households is a crucial employment field for immigrant women because of the decline of the welfare state in northern Europe, the decline of the extended family in southern Europe and the increasing numbers of female citizens in the workplace[58].
In Greece domestic work was never protected by labour laws[59]. The woman that cleans a private household and stays with the family is already stereotyped through the populist movies of the Greek cinema of the 60’s and the literature, as a poor and uneducated village woman in a long time need and dependence from the household family. Still, the immigrant women working in domestic work in Greece are not to be considered only as victims of the informal economy and the dominant discourses.
Tsianos, Marvakis and Parsanoglou note and criticize the ideological definition of immigration as a condition of misery[60]. Even when they are escaping from misery, the immigrants are political actors creating an important and autonomous political and social role in globalization from below, through community networks and migrant mobility[61]. A big number of the female domestic workers are high educated middle class women[62] choosing their own labor strategy. These strategies are connected to and supported from the informal solidarity networks of neighborhood and family, back in the sending country. In a great scale, female domestic workers in Europe are responsible for the financial support of their family members by sending remittances to their countries. These remittances seem to be more often their rational goal for doing domestic work and than their relocation in another country[63].
Although the Greek state has admitted there is a need for female domestic workers, this statement is not reflected on social policies protecting the immigrant women. During the last years various immigrant women associations are born in Greece, demanding social and political rights[64]. The immigrant women’s associations and political groups are building networks[65], and they cooperate with the migrant communities, with the Greek political groups, parties and organizations, with the local institutions and with the antiracist movement. Through a wide repertoire of formal and informal collective action, the immigrant women’s political groups are producing a new discourse about migration, female labor and female political participation. Female migration in Greece has also affected the creation of new migration supporting movements, new solidarity networks, informal collective action and new identities. New values and recourses were produced through these networks and conflicts.

2.3.Challenges for Social Movements to affect Social Change and the Evaluation of  Sociopolitical Rights
When states and supranational institutions fail in social policies, the social movement sector can affect social change. In Greece, immigrant organizations, collectives, immigrant communities, political groups and organizations supporting migration and refugees’ rights are demanding sociopolitical rights. Anthony Gidens was writing in 1982, discussing T.H. Marshall’s concept of citizenship, citizenship rights came not as a natural political process of an evolution that was helped by the beneficent hand of the state.  “Citizenships rights have been achieved in substantial degree only through struggle”[66].
The social worlds of migration affected the frames and the discourses of the new social movements after the Second World War and created new empirical and theoretical fields for social sciences. Undocumented immigrants’ political participation in movement organizations is an informal citizenship process against their non citizenship status and against the strategies of the political elites.
Immigration is not a social movement. It creates new social movements and new forms of collective action. Where the European and state policies are failing to stop the reproduction of insecurity and mistrust, the networks of the antiracist movement are maintaining a high level of solidarity among citizens and non-citizens, feelings of commonality and successive political struggles especially in the discursive battlefield. According to the writings of Charles Tilly social movements are a major vehicle for ordinary people's participation in public politics. In Tilly’s words, there are three major elements to a social movement[67]. Campaigns, which are a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities. The repertoire, as the employment of combinations from a variety of political action forms. The third element concerns the participants' concerted public representation of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments on the part of themselves and their constituencies[68].
The immigrants’, the antiracist and the solidarity movements in Greece consist of temporal coalitions within a number of different solidarity formal and informal political groups and organizations. According to Jan Pakulski, a social movement is different from an organized political group as well from occasional protests. Movements have no single centre but multiple centers. Strong value orientations give movements the quality of moral crusades and separate them from the instrumentally oriented actions of parties and interests groups[69].
Resource mobilization theory is an approach of social movements, which was inspired after the human rights movement of the 50s and the 60s and the new social movements of the 70s. Resource mobilization approaches social movements by studying the ability of movement's members to acquire resources and to mobilize people in a direction of furthering the movement organization goals[70]. In contrast to the traditional collective behavior[71] and the socio-psychological paradigm that was before dominant, resource mobilization views social movements as formed by rational social institutions and social actors taking political action[72]. Deprivation, repressions and discontent exist in every society. It is not social grievances that create social movements but the ability of dominated social groups to challenge and organize collective actions in an environment of political opportunities. For Resource mobilization Theory a social movement is a set of beliefs demanding social changes in some aspects of social structures or in the division of labor, or both. A social movement is born in the process of organizational forms of previously unorganized social groups that were not participating in the political processes of governance and decision making. It’s an expression of interests and opinions of the dominated groups through informal collective action against the interest of the formal political elites. It's an expression of interests and opinions of the dominated groups through informal collective action against the interest of the formal political elites. According to Resource Mobilization Theory, a core group of sophisticated strategists works to harness the disaffected energies, to attract money and supporters, to capture the media’s attention, to forge alliances with those in power, and to create an organizational structure. If the movement organizations gather these resources, social movements can be effective. In the case of the antiracist and the immigrant supporting collective action of social movements in Greece, it is not a group of sophisticated leaders that works to achieve these resources, but mostly a direct and horizontal decision making through open meetings and discussions between different members and collectives. Discussing the Greek case, the description of sophisticated leaders applies mostly to the formal collective action of the NGOs.
The collective action of the movement organizations supporting migration in Greece is voluntary and  contains actions such as writing articles about migration in the local newspapers, creating networks and relations between the immigrant communities, free language lessons from voluntary teachers, radio broadcasts about immigrants’ interests, symbolic protests, the printing of newspapers with participation of all the different immigrant communities, hospitality to refugees, medical and law support, protection from police deportations, multicultural events, demonstrations, hunger strikes, campaigns in schools, big meetings of the antiracist collectives, big antiracist festivals in various towns with the participation of all the immigrant communities and the political solidarity groups, organizations and collectives. It is a variety of multiple centers and networks, a welfare movement against the state’s violations and failures. The repertoire and the campaigns of the solidarity movement demand social change, asylum rights and citizenship for the immigrants and refugees in Greece and, consequently, in the intergovernmental policies and the policies of the European Union. Very often there is tension between direct forms of collective action and the paternalism of the Greek political collectives, the NGOs and the Greek political parties.
There is also tension between different frames, values, interests and priorities within the political groups and the immigrants. Karolos Kavoulakos, researching the immigrants’ protest and political participation in Greece through the coverage of the Greek press from 2003 until 2006, concludes that the Greek state’s refusal for immigrants’ sociopolitical rights is a discouraging precondition for autonomous immigrants’ protest[73]. Concerning the migrants’ organizations, there is a negative political opportunity structure affecting the quality and the quantity of their ability to affect social change. The approach of political opportunity structure demonstrates the situational circumstances and the structural elements of a political landscape or a system, which provide and legitimate or discourage and delegitimize the emergence of collective action and protest[74]. According to Kavoulakos, the successes of immigrants’ political struggles in Greece are in dependence from the alliances or the cooperation with Greek political organizations, which have their own political interests. Kavoulakos is also showing that immigrants’ organizations are participating in protest events where the aims of protest focus mostly to the Greek political system- and not to the sending countries. Especially in the public events where speech is the crucial factor of the protest, the organizational role of immigrant organizations appears to be dominated from the Greek organizations, at least until 2006.
The interests of the Greek political collectives, parties, movements and organizations can become dominant and paternalistic. Still, we will argue that the meeting of the immigrant collectives with the Greek movement organizations should also be seen as a process from ‘below’, and a self organized strategy concerning the immigrants’ political participation. Through their alliances, the immigrants are also changing the political agenda, the forms of collective action and the interests of the movement organizations. Except from finding resources, solidarity and access to the decision centers, the immigrants’ political action is changing the definition of the membership norms inside the movements and, consequently, in the whole of the political community and the political system. The processes of collective identities and the definition of the class struggles are extended in response to the new needs and demands for social justice and sociopolitical rights for every member of the political community. Through internal (inside the movements) and external (against the political elites) conflicts antiracist and antinationalistic issues are invigorated in the discursive battlefield of civil society, creating political opportunity structures for immigrant and human rights supporting collective action, as well as political opportunity structures for autonomous migration struggles.
In the winter of 2008, a hunger strike was decided from immigrant groups in the town of Chania in Crete, demanding sociopolitical rights for all immigrants. Despite the Greek and immigrant organizations’ and collectives’ deliberation, fifteen irregular immigrants went on hunger strike “forcing” the solidarity movement to participate and create a big campaign. Groups and organizations from different ideological, cultural, organizational and political background participated in collective actions of solidarity to the hunger strike, through a non-hierarchical decision making process - in response with the decisions of the immigrants in strike. The strike ended after twenty six days in January 6th, after the Minister of Interior announced to solidarity groups that he will provide the fifteen immigrants with a legal permit of residence and work in Greece. Although the goal of the hunger strike was not achieved, this process was considered successful from the solidarity movement, through a press release, as it is considered to have created an important “breach” to the Greek Authorities’ and the European Union’s policies of criminalization of migration and as it can be considered as a fountain of important political capital for the next struggles for immigrant’s rights[75].
Although different groups and advocates of immigrants may have different political interests, still the involvement of immigrants in social struggles in Greece empowers their political membership; it creates solidarity norms, solidarity networks and feelings of commonality. In the above political processes of the antiracist movement participants and support are secured. Furthermore, new meanings and understandings are constructed and proposed, aiming to the transformation of the old beliefs and the emerging of new values.



2.4. Challenges for Social Movements supporting Migration in Greece concerning the Transition of Frames
Migrant rights supporting movements are connected with different ideological and political interests. The immigrants’ struggles in Greece are in dependence from the success of the alliance between different political and immigrant groups and from the level of equal membership and involvement in the specific struggles. Through conflicts and dialogue, different frames have to be bridged and connected. New frames that are produced through collective action have to be connected with, to challenge and to transform the dominant frames that legitimize exclusion from citizenship rights.
In Goffman’s words, frames are the schemata that “allow individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label events with in their life space and the world at large”[76].
In the summer of 2008, in the town of Chania, Crete, a demonstration was organized from the “Immigrant Forum” and the “Arabian Forum” as a protest against the European pact. Immigrants and refugees were in the front of the demonstration, followed by solidarity groups, students, collectives, parties’ and unions’ representatives. During the stop in the police station, police officers announced to the representatives of the immigrants’ organizations that the local police authorities will consider seriously this protest against the discrimination and the deportations. Three very interesting slogans, which are shouted like a song, are born from the Arab immigrants during the demonstration, and are stated in ‘broken’ Greek: “No, no to Sarkozi”, “Not another ‘skoupa’ (deportation)” “Freedom! Yes!”  These slogans sung from the immigrants in Greek language are becoming the central slogans of the demonstration, framing it on the immigrant and refugees protesters’ demands. In which ways can these slogans represent elements of frames and hidden interpretive schemata that simplify and condense the world of the immigrants and refuges that are protesting? The prognostic attributions are formulated through direct statements against the discriminations from the state and the European Union policies (it is the era of the French presidency), and the diagnostic attribution as a demand, a desire and a support for the social and moral value of freedom, which is also supposed to be one of the fundamental political values of the European Union political project.
‘Skoupa’ is the Greek word for a “push broom”. During the nineties, the Greek media and the Greek police established this word to describe the police and army operations in the borders or inside the cities, when undocumented immigrants were gathered in police or army tracks and were deported. These operations became known as “Skoupa Operations”. This is a racist formulation stated by formal institutions, stating that some people are actually trashes and have to be rejected as a threat for the functional coherence of the society. The word ‘skoupa’ also reflects the Greek electronic media’s racist discourse, which generated and reproduced social discrimination and cultural racism against immigrants in the beginning of the 90’s. The role of this discourse is fundamental for the understanding of the public legitimating of racist and class discriminations in Greek society and state policies. The words “Albanian”, “Foreign”, or “Immigrant” became synonymous to a marginalized identity.
According to the Frame Analysis approach of social movements, from Benford and Snow, the frames serve as accenting devices that redefine a social condition as unjust, intolerable, immoral and deserving corrective action and function as modes of diagnostic attribution which is concerned with the problem identification and the prognostic attribution which addresses problem resolution[77]. Motivational frame serves as a call for action. Large scale social change can be achieved from social movements; through frame alignments, when the movements’ frames are connected with the larger belief system, are relevant with the participants’ realities and narrations and emerge the framing efforts of the current and the preexisting interests of cycles of protest[78]. Under this conditions frame alignment produces frame resonance, a process of transition from one frame to another.
According to frame analysis there are four types of frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation[79]. Frame bridging is the linkage between ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames. The ideological frames regarding the particular social problem of immigrant rights are connected structurally through the common projects of movement organizations and the immigrant communities. Frame amplification refers to the clarification and empowerment of the movement’s interpretive frames. The invigoration of the movements’ interpretive frames is connected with the invigoration of common values and beliefs. Justice, freedom and human rights are common accepted values that framing the antiracist movement. Frame extensions is the antiracist movement’s effort to incorporate different participants by extending boundaries of the proposed frames to include the views and interests of different groups, such as Muslim working together with Christian immigrant communities, or the creation of political tolerance between parts of far left, anarchists, transnational NGOs and parliament left. The fourth type of Frame alignment is frame transformation. This is a process required in different levels. First, inside the different participants groups and second in the solidarity group in general. In this political process the antiracist movement proposes new values, meanings and understandings and secures participants and support. It refers also to the transformation of the old beliefs and the emerging of new values.
Justice, freedom and human rights are common accepted values that framing the antiracist movement. The challenge for the social movements supporting migration in Greece, in the discursive battlefield, is to resist the adversary frames coming from political parties and the Media and to succeed overcoming the inner conflicts and the dialectic tension between the interpretive schemata and the forms of collective action.

Conclusion
The violation of human rights in the south-east ‘borders’ of Europe is not an alien political project to the European Asylum and Migration Policies. Freedom of movement is in dependence from the construction of the political idea of security as a fundamental value for the process of European policies. Resources were created for the nationalistic political powers, parties and movements. The common values of ‘Europeanization’ and the need for security and protection of the European identity are established in the fear of the ‘other’. New authorities and political autonomy are given to national and transnational border police and army institutions and new technologies of control were granted. Social control technologies are represented as social values and the “ultra solution to a permanent state of fear”[80]. A humanitarian tragedy established as the “fight against illegal immigration” is directly connected with National States’ and European Union’s policies from the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Hague Program to the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in 2008 from the E.U. heads of state and government.
Although the mechanisms of security against immigrants are very well structured and organized, it does not seem to work the same way with the social policies and their structures[81].  The absence of strong structures of social care and the illegalization of migration reflects the European Employment Strategy. According to Papadopoulos “social security policies are no longer a means to protect society from potential failures of a market economy, nor does a means to ‘steer’ the economy to respond and meet social need…Rather, they are to become a means to 'steer' the behavior of individuals to make them adaptable to what are perceived by governments to be the demands of their market economies…”[82]. Violation of human rights and denial of asylum at the south borders of Europe reflects dynamics of European and economic policies against immigrants and especially against unskilled workers in the three sectors of production.
When governments and European institutions of governance fail to produce welfare policies, the social movement sector can affect social change, social justice and the evaluation of rights and membership.
Greece is considered a gate, a transit to and a south east border to Europe for immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. We discussed elements of the antiracist and the immigrant supporting social movements in Greece, in a very early and primary approach, aiming to construct fundamental hypotheses and theoretical questions as a first step for a broader and more empirical based research. 
Most of the immigrants that participate in the antiracist movement in Greece do not have the Greek citizenship or full socio-political rights. Still, our hypothesis is that it would be irrelevant to call them non-citizens even in technical terms. The immigrant members of the antiracist movement in Greece are active transformers of the repertoire, the aims, the frames and the identities created through the movements’ collective action. Direct political participation on the public decision making is fundamental for the concept of citizenship. The challenge and the choice of a horizontal, equal and direct democrat way of decision making reflects the new forms of protest, organization of collective action and decision making. It reflects also the anti-hierarchical organizational tradition of the new social movements and emerges their frames and existing preoccupations concerning social change. Participation in collective action aiming to sociopolitical rights and full membership for immigrants reflects the core of the political idea of democracy. Through their organizational activities the social movements supporting migration are building networks with the local political groups, creating social capital. In contrary with R. Putnam’s concept of social capital that is not allowed to be created in political struggles and conflicts[83], the repertoire and the campaigns of the collective action of the Arabic, Asian, East European, African and Balkan forums, political groups, movement organizations, unions and communities, is generating solidarity norms and social trust, bridging networks between different communities that overcome national and cultural differences, in the name of a common rational goal: to declare citizenship rights for all immigrants and refugees.
According to a ‘selective’ interpretation of a Marxist perspective, national heterogeneity is a bad precondition for the interests of the working class. In a primal perspective - which is emerged from the empirical paradigms of the social movements supporting migration in Greece - it seems that heterogeneity is not a disadvantage, but in the contrary, a spring of evaluation between the solidarity groups a spring of  resources’ mobility and exchange, and of building, in Kymlicka’s and Banting’s words, panethnic coalitions for social justice[84]


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[1] In November 2008 a report from the Human Rights Watch, criticizes the way that the states of Greece and Turkey are violating human rights. The report contains testimonies from Iraqis and other asylum seekers and migrants on both sides of the Greek-Turkish entrance to Europe “about pushbacks and summary expulsions from Greece, inhuman and degrading conditions of detention in Greece, Greek police and coast guard brutality and harassment, and the blocking of access to asylum in Greece as well as the denial of asylum and other forms of protection to those needing it.”Human Rights Watch (2008) Stuck in a Revolving Door, Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union, HRW, November 1-56432-411-7.
[2] Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS), Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC), Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) (2008) A Gamble with the Right to Asylum in Europe - Greek asylum policy and the Dublin II Regulation, NOAS-NHC-GHM, Athens and Oslo, http://www.nhc.no/php/files/documents/Publikasjoner/Rapporter/Landogtema/2008/Greece_DublinII_report.pdf 
[3] Human Rights Watch (2008)
[4] For example, the number of Iraqis lodging Asylum increased in Greece from 1.415 (in 2006) to 5.500 (in 2007) Human Rights Watch (2008). Greece comes fourth in asylum seekers after Sweden, France and the U.K. Iraqis are the largest nationality group of asylum seekers entering Greece. In 2006, 2000 Iraqis applied for asylum in Greece. None were granted. The asylum approval rates for applicants of all nationalities are extremely low: 0.6% in 2006 and 1.2% in 2007. Despite the Greek state’s policies, the number of refugees and undocumented immigrants entering Greece is increasing every year, a fact that shows the limits of the national and transnational governance institutions controlling the powers of migration.
[5] With this slogan, the media represented last year’s conversations between Italy, Libya and Malta about oil exploration and maritime limits.
[7]  According to a number of reports, researches and documents from the Amnesty International in http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/mauritania. In Mauritania, under a regime that is often accused for violating the human rights and reported as guilty for routine tortures, “information gathered by Amnesty International reveals that military cooperation between the EU and Mauritania presented as a security and humanitarian operation but has given rise to the violation of certain fundamental rights of migrants in Mauritania.” Amnesty International, (2008), Mauritanie. "Personne ne veut de nous". Arrestations et expulsions collectives de migrants interdits d'Europe, AFR 38/001/2008, London, 1st July. Also: Amnesty International (2008) “Document-Mauritania: Nobody Wants to have Anything to do with us, Arrests and Collective Expulsions of Migrants Denied Entry Into Europe”, (AFR 38/001/2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR38/005/2008/en/8f76e77c-4613-11dd-bff4-eb668f66e565/afr380052008eng.html
[8] Kymlicka, Will and Banting, Keith G. (2006) Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State'. Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 281-304: 281
[9] Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera and Thierry Balzacq  (2008) ‘The Changing Dynamics of Security in an Enlarged European Union’, CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) Challenge Papers, No. 12, October.
[10] In 2008 the European Organization UNITED reported more than 11.000 documented deaths of immigrants trying to enter the European Union since 1993. UNITED for Intercultural Action, European network against nationalism, racism, fascism and in support of migrants and refugees (2008) “List of 11105 documented refugee deaths through Fortress Europe”, http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/actual_listofdeath.pdf
[11] Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby (2008) ”Necrocapitalism”, Organizational Studies, 29 [12]; 1541-63.
[12] Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby (2008), p.1545
[13] Kymlicka, Will and Banting, Keith G. (2006), p.281
[14] Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Hansen, Peo and Castles, Stephen  (2006) Migration, Citizenship and the European Welfare State. A European Dilemma, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
[15] Agamben, Giorgio, (1998), Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life, Stanford University Press, Stanford
[16] Agamben, Giorgio, (1998)
[17] Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera and Thierry Balzacq  (2008)
[18] Council of the European Union, “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”, 13440/08 ASIM 72, Brussels, 2008.
Also: Carrera, Sergio and Elspeth Guild (2008) ‘The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’, CEPS Policy brief, No. 170, September
[19] International Organization for Migration (2008) World Migration 2008, Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy, IOM World Migration Report Series, Volume 4, Geneva,
[20]  List of Documents for the 8th Conference of European Health Ministers, People on the Move: Human Rights and Challenges for Health Care Systems, Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 22-23 November 2007, http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/health%5CConferences%5Cdocumentlist_en.asp  Also: Parliamentary Assembly (2000) “Health conditions of migrants and refugees in Europe”, Rapporteur: Lord Ponsonby, Socialist Group, United Kingdom, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Doc. 86509, February
[21] With the slogan “Less immigrants, more oil” the media represented the last year’s conversations between Italy, Libya and Malta about oil exploration and maritime limits.
[22] Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera and Thierry Balzacq  (2008)
[23] Balibar, Etienne (1996), ”Is European Citizenship Possible?”, Public Culture, 8 [2]; 355-376 p.367
[24] King, Russell (2002) ‘Towards a new map of European migration’, International Journal of Population Geography, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 89-106.
[25] Kymlicka, Will and Banting, Keith G. (2006), p. 282
[26] Diken, Bulent (2004) ”From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City”, Citizenship Studies, 8 [1]; 83-106.
[27] According to Tesfahuney and Ek “the camp as the nomos of the modern did not appear at the end of the 19th century, as Agamben seems to suggest…(the camp) has a long history that stretches from the slave camps, plantation economies, indentured labor, and Indian reservations in the 16th-19th centuries, the Spanish and German concentration camps in the 19th and 20th century in Cuba and Namimbia, the concentration camps for Japanese and Asians in the US in the 1940s, and finaly to the English camps in Kenya in the 1950s.” Tesfahuney, Mekonnen, and Ek, Richard (2009), Citizens in Dromocratic Camp, The International Workshop on Regional Citizenship, REMESO, Linkoping University, March 31-April 1, 2009, p.12
[28] Tesfahuney, Mekonnen, and Ek, Richard (2009), p.12
[29] Hansen, Peo (2009) ”Post-National Europe, Without Cosmopolitan Guarantees”, Race and Class, vol.50 [4]: 20-37, SAGE
[30]  Peo Hansen writes about a European hypernationalism:“Had national sovereignty really constituted the ‘sanctity’ that countless scholars want us to believe, there would have been no EU in the first place, no Single Market either, and certainly no swapping of national currencies for the euro – so much for the national currency being one of the crown jewels of national sovereignty. National governments rather guard their political interests dressed up as national interests. And when such political interests are deemed to be better met through a transfer of certain policy competencies to the supranational level, national sovereignty may soon prove to be a stumbling block to be overcome rather than something to be ‘jealously guarded’. A seeming paradox in all of this lies in the fact that, whereas the current policy development occurs in the name of supranationalization or ‘European cooperation’, and thus easily evades any accusations of national egoism, its foundation nonetheless builds on an aggregate of very traditional nationalist components and sentiments, not least when cast in a European context. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Commission proposals for supranational migration policy are teeming with the traditional weapons of national sovereignty: militarized border controls, forced deportations, visa requirements, rigorous surveillance and demonization of the migrant ‘stranger’”. Hansen, Peo (2009), p.32
[31] Hansen, Peo (2009),  p.28
[32] Balibar, Etienne (1996)
[33] Andrian Favel and Randall Hansen write about the enlargement:“…enlargement is only about changing the nature of the boundary for some, putting it more in the hands of bottom-up individual economic actors rather than the top-down nationalism of state actors concerned with preserving the nation. For many other, more distant and desperate migrants seeking access to Europe, enlargement will bring nothing. Europe will still be their `Amerika’, an impossible new beginning, achieved only after scaling exclusionary `fortress’ walls. Another serious consequence of market-led migration is the further downgrading of citizenship and welfare rights for residents, in favour of market flexibility and a precarious workforce unprotected by benefits. The emptiness of `EU citizenship’-which is little more than a fancy PR packaging of minimal cross-national economic rights for workers in the EU- signals this concern” Favell, Adrian & Hansen, Randall (2002) ”Markets against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and the Idea of Europe”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 [4]; 581-601, p.598
[34] Woolfson, Charles (2009) ”Labour Migration, Neo-Liberalism and Ethno-Politics in the New Europe: The Latvian Case”, forthcoming issue of Antipode
[35] Woolfson, Charles (2009), p.14
[36] Kontis A., Zografakis S., Mitrakos T. (2006) Economic Sequences of Immigrant Employment in the Greek GDP the Last Ten Years (in Greek), University of Athens, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Centre for Research of Immigration and Diaspora, Knowledge Systems, Athens and Petrakou H., Kontis A., Oikonomou M., Zampelis P. Nikolopoulos  P. Kehagia A., Mentoring A.E. (2007) Analytical Study of  the Sequences of Migration in Social Insurance (in Greek), Institut of Migration Policies, University of Aegean, Depatrment of Geography, Monitoring A.E.,
[37] In 2006 the 43% of the workers in construction were immigrants. In industry sector in 2004 almost 25% of the workers were immigrants. These statistics are concerning the documented workers that are insured from the national institute of social security. As irregular labor is a “regime” in Greece, for both immigrants and Greek workers, the numbers of irregular workers can only be guessed. Data taken from the most recent publicly available statistical data of IKA (Social Insurance Foundation, “Employement Data for May 2006”, Athens, 2007) on the distribution of workers by Nationality and Activity in Greece, from the site of the NGO Antigone, Information & Documentation Centre on Racism, Ecology, Peace and Non Violence, http://www.antigone.gr/statistics/
[38]  Migration created 100.000 new labor places for Greek workers and 15.000 for immigrants. According to the new researches migration in Greece raised the GDP and helped the vivification and the financing of the welfare system. Theodoridis, Nasos (2008) Annual Report 2008 (in Greek), Antigone- Information & Documentation Centre on Racism, Ecology, Peace and Non Violence, Also: Kontis A., Zografakis S., Mitrakos T. (2006)  and Petrakou H., Kontis A., Oikonomou M., Zampelis P. Nikolopoulos  P. Kehagia A., Mentoring A.E. (2006)
      The undocumented migration of the 90s had also positive effects on GDP but the socio-economic factors prevent the economic and social integration of the first undocumented immigrants. Fakiolas, Rossetos (1999) Socio-economic Effects of Immigration in Greece, Journal of European Social Policy, 9, 3, p. 211-229
[39] Theodoridis, Nasos (2008)
[40] According to Azizi Kalanzi and Eyfrosyni Spanea from the Department of Psychology of the University of Athens, concerning the population that participated in the research project, 37% of Albanians and 29% of Bulgarians are documented suffering from depression, a big percentage in comparison with 14,6% of Greek citizens suffering from the same disease. Gregoriou A., “Depression “beats” immigrants”, Eleytherotypia, 29/07/2007,  http://mighealth.net/el/index.php/  Also: Institute for Migration Policies (2007) The Psycho-social Profile of the Immigrant and his Inergration (in Greek), European Profiles, Athens,
[41] Ministry of the Interior (2008) “Reorganization of the council police and other regulations in responsibility of the Ministry of Interior”, (in Greek) Law No. 3731, ΦΕΚ A 263/23.12.2008 and General Administration of migration Policy-Ministry of Interior (2008), “Implementation of the Arrangements of the article 91, Paragraph n.2 of the l.3386/05, The Greek Republic, replaced from the article 18, Paragraph 1 of the  l.3536/07, Athens, 18 June, www.ypes.gr/allodapoi/content/GR/sxetika/13431_18-6-08.doc
[42] Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Codification of Legislation on the Entry, Residence and Social Integration of Third-Country Nationals on Greek Territory”, Government Gazette, Law 3386/2005 as amended by Laws 3448/2006 (GG A 57), 3536/2007 (GG A 42), 3613/2007 (GG A 263) and 3731/2008 (GG A 263), http://www.ypes.gr/allodapoi/content/GR/nomoi.htm
[43] Ministry of the Interior (2008)
[44] According to the ‘Ratification of the Greek Nationality’, the Citizenship rights connected with Nationality are established in the law of blood, See: President of the Hellenic Republic (2004) LAW 3284, “Ratification of the Greek Nationality Code”, Government Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, First Issue, No.F092.22/6222, Issue number 217, 10 November
[45]  Schierup, Carl-Ulrik & Stephen Castles (2009) “Migration and welfare states”, Manuscript draft, January, p.4  Also: Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, Oxford,
[46] For the terms of “informalization from below” and “informalization from above” see Slavnic, Zoran (2007) "Informalisation of the Economy and the Recommodification of Labour", in Erik Berggren, Branka Likic-Brboric, Gülay Torsöz and Nicos Trimiklionitis (eds.), Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe, Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.
[47] Schierup, Carl-Ulrik & Stephen Castles (2009)
[48] Kaidatzis, Akritas (2008) “Social Rights, Citizenship and Immigrants” (in Greek), in Kabounidi T, Karidis B, Nikolakopoulou-Stefanou I, Stylianoudi L M.G, Immigration in Greece: Experiences, Policies, Anticipations, Vol.2, IMEPO (Institute for Migration Policies), Athens
[49] The unemployment in Greece is 8.9% to 11% according to the state’s statistics and a variety of tables, publications and interviews from ESYE-General Secretariat of the National Statistical Service of Greece, http://www.statistics.gr/anaz.asp. Women in Greece are consisting the 60% of the unemployment youth. The female unemployment is two times bigger from the male unemployment. Female unemployment was 34% between the ages of 15 to 24 in 2005. The women salaries in Greece are 15% lower than the salaries of men, often in the same professions, especially in the third sector. Mauroidi, Maria, “Young Woman Means Unemployment and ‘Black Labor”, http://www.koel.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1792 and Kritikidis, Giorgos (2004)  "Young Woman and Employment" (in Greek), InfoMagazine  ΙΝΕ-ΓΣΕΕ, (Institut of Labour- General Confederation of Workers in Greece), Issue 103, February
[50] Social Insurance Foundation (2007)
[51] Periklis Korovesis, a deputy of the left party in Greece, noted in a formal question in the Greek parliament that there are 80.000 immigrant women working in domestic work, health and social care. According to P. Korovesis the Greek state is saving 23.5 million Euros, every year as this money are given from private households to immigrant female workers for services in health and social care. The salaries for female domestic workers are close to 650 Euros per month. The data of ESYE Research of Work Force table for the second semester of 2005 are representing that 46.821 immigrant women are working in health, social care and, the 43.545 of them, in private households. P. Korovesis estimates that the number of domestic workers was doubled from 2001 to 2007. (in Greek) http://www.ana-mpa.gr/anaweb/user/showprel?service=3&maindoc=7354351
[52] In 7/5/08, EKKE (National Centre for Social Research) presented a research about “Women Migration in Greece. 612 female migrants aged between 16 to 77 years old, they all expressed grievances concerning their problems with bureaucracy, the permit to stay in Greece, the hard work and their low salaries. 42.5% answered that they had not any kind of insurance, 31.8% because of the denial of their male and female bosses. 27.7% have chosen to  stay uninsured because they had to pay the contribution for social security services or the revenue stamps, 26,4% had not a permanent employment and 10,0% could not be insured because of problems with bureaucracy. Theodoridis, Nasos, 2008
[53]  Lutz, Helma, "When Home Becomes a Workplace: Domestic Work as an Ordinary Job in Germany?" in Helma Lutz (ed.), (2008), Migration and Domestic Work. A European Perspective on a Global Theme: Aldershot 72-103,.
[54] Lutz, Helma, (2008), p.95
[55] “Household work is and – for the time being remains – a ‘feminized’ activity that is gratuitously provided without social prestige. According to the financial circumstances of the employers, domestic work can be converted at any time from paid into unpaid labour, performed as family or neighbourly service. Serious efforts and normalization strategies cannot belie the hierarchies of differences that are at stake: work in the private sector, and work as a public occupation cannot be reconciled because of the split in their institutional logic” from Lutz, Helma (2008), p. 96
[56] Zoran Slavnic  writes on his concept of “informalization from below”: “…(the groups’ and individuals’) engagement in the informal economy – those processes that we may call informalization from below – is on the one hand a reaction to informalization from above, that is, marginalization, exploitation and stigmatization, and on the other hand the only way for the majority of them to survive.  At the same time these strategies make their specific contribution to the reproduction of both dominant discourses about the informal economy and dominant social and economical (power) relationships”Slavnic, Zoran  (2007) "Informalisation of the Economy and the Recommodification of Labour", in Erik Berggren, Branka Likic-Brboric, Gülay Torsöz and Nicos Trimiklionitis (eds.), Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe, Shaker Publishing, Maastricht, p.12
[57] Anderson, Bridget (2000), Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour, London: Zed Books,
[58] Anderson, Bridget, (2000)
[59] Hantzaroula Pothiti on Lutz, Helma (2008) "Introduction: Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe", in Helma Lutz (ed.), Migration and Domestic Work. A European Perspective on a Global Theme: Aldershot 1-10, p.7
[60] Tsianos V., Marvakis T., Parsanoglou D., (2005) “Without Documents, Without a Voice! Immigrants in the Heart of the Social Struggles”, http://www.kinimata.gr/pagosmio_k_k/2metanastefi-ratsismos/kimena-paremvasis.html
[61] Tsianos V., Marvakis T., Parsanoglou D. (2005), and Castles, Stephen (2007) ‘Twenty-First-Century Migration as a Challenge to Sociology’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 351–71.
[62] Lutz, Helma, 2007, p.2
[63] Lutz, Helma, (ed.),  Migration and Domestic Work. A European Perspective on a Global Theme, Aldershot, 2008
[64] In 7th October 2006 during a demonstration in Athens for the rights of the second generation in Athens, the United African Women Organization and the Network of Immigrant women in Greece announced in three languages that: “We as women, wives and mothers have decided to come together with one voice to fight for the legalization of the children born in Greece. It is time to let a cry that our children are entitled to be citizens of the only country they know…”  http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=580361. The citizenship rights of the second generation are considered to be of the big demands of the immigrants’ protests of the last years. As the political struggles continue, the demonstrations and the discourse of the women organizations and groups mobilized and affected the social movements in Greece. 
[65] Some of the immigrant women organizations in Greece are the Union of Nigerian Women, the Filipinos’ Women, the Network of Immigrant Women in Athens, the Union of Immigrant Women in Thessaloniki, the United African Women Organization. There is a big number of less or more strong organizations all over Greece created from women from Afghanistan, Kenya, Soudan, Ghana, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Cameroun with different ways of political and social participation.
Resources from: http://www.stekichania.gr/, http://www.yvettejarvis.gr, http://www.civilsociety.gr/, http://www.anthropos.gr/
[66]  Giddens, Anthony (1982) Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, London: Macmillan, p.171
[67]  Tilly, Charles (2004) Social Movements, 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers
[68] Tilly, Charles (2004). Also: Tilly, Charles, and Tarrow, Sidney (2006) Contentious Politics, Paradigm Publishers, and Tilly, Charles (2006)  Regimes and Repertoires, University of Chicago Press,
[69]Pakulski, Jan, Mass Social Movements and Social Class, International Sociology 1999; 8; 131, Sage, 1993,
[70] Diana Kendall, Sociology In Our Times, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005,
[71] Marx G.T., και Wood J.L (1975) “Strands of  Theory and Research in Collective Behavior”, Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 1975
[72] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, (2001) The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory of Social Movements in Jonathan H. Turner (ed.), Handbook of Sociological Theory p.535-65 Also: Jenkins J.C., (1983) “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology, 9, p.527-553, Steven M. Buechler (1999) Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism, Oxford University Press, Serdedakis, Nikos (2005) “Resource Mobilization Theory: A critical Review” (in Greek), http://www.kinimata.gr/kinonika_kinimata/8eories_silogikis_drasis_kai_k_k/2_8eories_kinitopiisis_poron/2_8eories_kinitopiisis_poron.htm
[73] Kavoulakos, Karolos (2008)‘The Protest of Immigrants: the Political Opportunity Structure and the Role of Advocates’ (in Greek) in the forthcoming Kontis N, and Tatsis, N. (eds.), Immigration and Civil Society, Papazisis, Athens,
[74]  Kavoulakos, Karolos (2008), See also: Koopmans R. (2004) 'Migrant mobilisation and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30:3, 449 – 470. Caponio, T. (2005) 'Policy Networks and Immigrants' Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31:5, 931 – 95 Vermeulen F. (2005) 'Organisational Patterns: Surinamese and Turkish Associations in Amsterdam, 1960-1990', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31:5, 951 – 973
[75]  For all the press releases of the immigrants’ hunger strike in Chania of Crete see also the site of the Group of Immigrants and Refugees in http://www.clandestina.org. Coincidentally, the hunger strike ended a few hours before Alexis Gregoropoulos, a fifteen year old student, was shot dead by a police patrol in Athens. A wave of protest, riots and occupations followed the murder of Grigoropoulos. These events were defined, through different perspectives, as the Greek Riots, the Rebellion of December or the Uprising of December. Important migrant and antiracist organizations and collectives participated in the demonstrations of December and released public announcements of solidarity and membership in the December of 2008 uprising in Greece.
[76] Goffman, Erving (1974) Frame Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[77] Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford (1992) 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" in Morris, Aldon D. and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p.137
[78] Bedford, Robert and Snow, David (2000), Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assesment, Annual Report of Sociology, 26, p.611-639
[79] Bedford, Robert and Snow, David (2000),
[80] Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera and Thierry Balzacq (2008)
[81] In a research presented from the organization Medecins Sans Frontieres for a European country, in 770 immigrant workers it is documented that 40% of the irregular and regular immigrant workers are living in abandoned buildings, 50% are living without toilet and water, 70% are suffering from chronic diseases because of their working conditions in farming or industry and 30% have faced violence in their workplace. Rousis, Nikos, “Without health care and insurance”, Eleytherotypia, 26/11/2007
[82] Papadopoulos, Theo, "The Recommodification of European Labour: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations", Bath: European Research Institute Working Paper WP-05-03. 2005, p.4
[83] Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, New York
[84] Kymlicka, Will and Banting, Keith G., (2006), p.290
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